While some may associate the subject of philosophy with eggheads who talk about old, dead Greeks and Romans, the truth is much more layered and exciting than that: Fundamentally, philosophy concerns our views of life, truth, the world, ethics, and other topics that form our basic worldviews. Consequently, it is relevant to our Christian confession. Yes, it includes discussion about history, but it is not limited to that by any means.
In last week’s post, I introduced readers to the book, Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy, which includes contributions from Graham Oppy (naturalist), K. Scott Oliphint (presuppositionalist), Timothy McGrew (evidentialist), and Paul Moser (non-evidentialist).[1] We reviewed their respective views on the relationship of Christianity and philosophy, as well as their competing ideas on the meaning of philosophy and the question of presuppositions. An additional area of dispute among these authors, which is an outworking of their approach to presuppositions, we might group under the heading of natural theology, which we will consider this week.
Arguments for natural theology
Natural theology refers to the theory that man may discern a certain body of truth, including religious truths about the nature of God, from the natural law, which is a form of general revelation. Adherents of this form of revelation believe that it works in tandem with particular (or special) revelation, such as the Holy Scriptures, but also that nature is nonetheless sufficient for some religious truths. Consequently, we should not conflate the concept of natural theology with that of either general revelation or of natural law, even though they undoubtedly overlap.[2]
As the book’s resident evidentialist, McGrew reviews several arguments for natural theology, including arguments related to “the origin of the universe, the origin of life, the fact of consciousness, and the existence of objective good and evil” (130). He also summarizes the logical, moral, and evidential problems of evil (137–41). Additionally, he appeals to “evidences,” pointing to historical facts, rational points, and the like, in his rebuttal to Oppy (54–58).
McGrew characterizes arguments from natural theology as providing clues to mankind about the nature of reality, truth, and so forth: “The factual bases for the arguments that I have briefly discussed above play the role of clues” (141). If man would but open his eyes and use his mind, he could discover clues in the universe that point to the truths of Christianity. However, each of other contributors to this volume offers critique to McGrew’s articulation of natural theology.
Critiques of natural theology
(1) Confirmation v. clues
For example, Moser points out that McGrew conclusions do not deliver on his promises. To illustrate, McGrew, at the beginning of his chapter, leads with the assertion that philosophy confirms Christianity. Although confirm can mean to strengthen or to reinforce, it generally means to establish the truth of something, to give assurance, or even to make definite. Yet after making such strong claims about what arguments for natural theology can accomplish—namely, confirm truth—he ends with a “fittingly modest assessment of the value of his arguments” (164), says Moser, which is considerably less definite, even tenuous, than McGrew’s model would otherwise suggest. Moser explains,
The talk of a ‘clue’ and ‘point[ing] toward’ is sufficiently vague to leave us puzzled. The pressing question is how the kind of ‘clue’ or ‘pointing toward’ in question relates to adequate evidence for Christian theism. . . . Given the gist of the convergence perspective, particularly its claim that ‘philosophy confirms Christianity,’ we might have expected a case for the position that the arguments of natural theology confirm Christian theism. McGrew, however, offers a more modest claim: ‘. . . the prima face evidence from natural theology ought to put it [Christianity] on the table for thoughtful consideration. . . .’ Putting Christianity on the table for thoughtful consideration does seem advisable, but it does not bring adequate evidence for (endorsing) Christian theism. In addition, it seems that Christianity, owing to its potential explanatory value at least, should be on the table for thoughtful consideration even if all the arguments of natural theology fail (165–66).
McGrew dismisses Moser’s response out of hand: “I am puzzled by his puzzlement” (169). But I believe Moser has a point: McGrew’s high hopes for natural theology exceed what it can actually accomplish. Now, that is not to suggest that evidences have no value. But as an example, rather than natural theology’s talking about proofs for God’s existence, Moser quotes Abraham Heschel, who said, “There are no proofs for the existence of the God of Abraham. There are only witnesses.”[3] By so stating, Heschel, as well as Moser, are referring to the so-called “proofs for God’s existence,” which are often associated with evidential apologetics.
(2) Presuppositions
Oliphint argues along similar lines as Moser, except that he appeals to the existence of presuppositions. If the arguments of natural theology were so effective, then skeptics could weigh the strength of them and, finding them sufficiently compelling, come to accept them as true—except that, to Oliphint’s point, that is not what often occurs. Even skeptics that claim to follow a philosophical neutralism, such as Oppy, nonetheless hold and demonstrate presuppositions.
For example, McGrew presents several rational arguments in his reply to Oppy’s presentation of naturalism—and, indeed, such arguments may have their place. Many Christians would find that McGrew’s arguments have genuine credibility and real strength. The problem is that Oppy does not think much of them, even giving reasons for his position (151–53). But, again, it is not that these arguments are actually weak. Oliphint would point out that Oppy has rational presuppositions, even if Oppy would deny he has them. Even reasons (and reason) have presuppositions.
(3) Sin
In addition to identifying the existence of presuppositions, Oliphint points to the problem of sin. Of course, the naturalist might deny that such a thing exists. But the Christian believes in the existence of sin and its effect even on man’s mind: “Speculative or worldly philosophy,” says Oliphint, “is a practice that claims to love wisdom, but by virtue of its constant, intractable, and sinful suppression of the truth, it moves inexorably toward foolishness” (210–11, italics added).
At the very least, an admission of the noetic effects of sin (or sin’s effect on man’s mind) should temper the Christian’s expectations for what the rational enterprise can accomplish. That point does not mean that it cannot accomplish anything (it does) or that God cannot work through it (He does). It is simply to say that presuppositions and sin play an inescapable role in it.
(4) False information
Owing to the existence of presuppositions and the problem of sin, another critique that these authors make is that natural theology, for all of its presumption, can actually yield false information. For example, some figures argue that pagan philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, have discerned religious truths simply by the use of their natural, autonomous reason that is unaided by divine grace.
Now, it may be that pagan philosophers have said true things with respect to religious knowledge. But the presuppositionalist—consistent with everyone from Clement of Alexandria to John Calvin to Ronald Nash—might point to God’s mysterious non-salvific grace that guides even unbelievers in the pursuit of truth as the Word of God (Jesus Christ) makes intelligible the words of God (whether through forms of general or particular revelation) and the words of man to the mind of man.[4]
Even so, many critics of natural theology have observed that these pagan philosophers have not discerned religious truths as much as proponents of natural theology might suggest. For example, Moser contrasts the false gods of Plato and Aristotle from the true God of the Hebrew-Christian religion: Whereas the former are “immutable and impassible . . . unmoved and unmovable, without passions or emotions,” the latter is “active,” self-manifesting,” and “affective” (177). He later explains, “The speculative arguments of philosophy, found in traditional natural theology, will not take us to such a God [the true God], even if they yield lesser gods who fall short of worthiness of worship” (197). In short, for all the help that natural theology claims to offer, it can present propositions that are deficient to, if not at odds with, the true nature of things.
Conclusion
As the reader can see, the subject of natural theology occupies significant space in Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy, and it contributes to a fair share of disagreement. Still, notice how it demonstrates the importance of philosophy. Our beliefs about the existence of presuppositions and the problem of sin, and their respective influences on man’s thinking, have vast implications for our theology. In conclusion, the subject of philosophy may present difficulties at times, but the pursuit is a worthwhile one.
[1]Moser does not identify himself by the term non-evidentialist. Instead, it is one I have chosen to characterize him (perhaps there is a better term). Throughout his writing, he associates evidences with speculative or worldly wisdom, as opposed to spiritual wisdom. Although he does not appeal explicitly to neo-orthodox thinkers, his patterns of thought, and even his expressions, are consistent with their views, which may help to explain his suspicion of such forms of argumentation. As Oliphint says, “Moser is partial to terms like ‘event’ and ‘self-manifestation’ and ‘experiential.’ Such terms evoke my orthodox antennae and cause me to wonder if neoorthodoxy is lurking nearby” (208).
[2]Complicating this discussion is the fact that different people use these terms differently, thereby creating confusion and contradiction. For our purposes, general revelation refers to the doctrine that God has revealed some truths to mankind generally, which men and women, at any time and in any place, may theoretically observe. Natural law refers more specifically to the law that God has woven into the fabric of nature. In many ways, these two concepts are two sides of the same coin; still, they are distinct. Natural theology, defined in the body of this article, refers to the belief that a body of theology may emerge from the natural law of general revelation.
[3]Abraham Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 27; cited in Paul K. Moser, “Conformation Model,” in Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy, ed. Paul M. Gould and Richard Brian Davis, Counterpoints: Bible and Theology, ed. Stanley N. Gundry (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016), 179.
[4]For more on this type of logos Christology applied to religious epistemology, see Ronald H. Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1982).
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