Approximately one year ago, in the spring of 2020, I was invited to begin teaching Welch College’s offering of Christian Philosophy, which occupies a place in the general education curriculum. Since that time, I have taught four iterations of the course and have loved every minute of it. The subject of philosophy is not simply about philosophers and their ideas. It is also about what and how we think; to that extent, it is relevant to everyone, contrary to the opining of some students.
How we think about the state of the world, the life of the mind, and the role of reason can vary quite widely. This fact is demonstrated by Zondervan’s publication, Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy, which includes contributions from Graham Oppy, K. Scott Oliphint, Timothy McGrew, and Paul Moser.[1] Such presentations are appealing because they permit readers to observe competing views about any number of topics. In this post, I will summarize the basic positions of each contributor on the subject of Christianity and philosophy. Then I will interact with some of the most salient features of their differences.
What are the authors’ positions?
Graham Oppy writes as a non-Christian and argues for a conflict model in which philosophical inquiry demonstrates the falsity of basic Christian teaching. More particularly, he espouses a form of naturalism and criticizes Christian supernaturalism. However, Oppy erects a superficial structure, which standard rebuttals from Christian apologetics can dismantle, as Timothy McGrew exemplifies in his response to Oppy. Additionally, Oppy argues for the position of philosophical neutrality wherein interlocutors leave aside their intellectual commitments. And yet he points to the virtue of ontological simplicity in philosophical discourse (i.e., an ontological commitment).
By contrast, K. Scott Oliphint observes that all inquiry and discourse is necessarily laden with presuppositions and values. He does not thereby deny that real communication is possible; he simply recognizes that we all come to conversations with certain ideas in mind about the concepts and words we use. Oliphint writes as a Christian in the tradition of Abraham Kuyper and Cornelius Van Til. He argues for a covenantal model of Christianity and philosophy, which he traces through the doctrines of Creation, Fall, and Restoration: God created man with a mind, but the Fall corrupts even man’s thinking in “sinful suppression of the truth” about which he is “immersed in utter and radical self-deception” (211). Thankfully, God would restore that which is lost.
Whereas Oliphint assumes a presuppositional posture, McGrew presents an evidential vision that appeals to natural theology. He draws inspiration from Joseph Butler, Thomas Chalmers, and B. B. Warfield (105), and he identifies his view as the convergence model in which “philosophy confirms Christianity, and Christianity completes philosophy” (124).[2]
Finally, Paul Moser offers a non-evidential model that he describes as the conformation model: “wisdom and philosophy benefit Christian faith only when they are conformed to the lordship of God in Christ” (176). He emphasizes God’s “self-manifestation” as an aspect of His revelatory function over against “speculative arguments,” which he associates with natural theology, including arguments for God’s existence (184, 188–89).
What is philosophy?
One clear point of disagreement among these authors is the meaning of philosophy. Oppy and McGrew offer compatible definitions. Rather than seeing philosophy as a set of substantive beliefs, they view it as a discipline or tool of rational inquiry (23, 124).[3] These scholars rightly point to the discipline of philosophy as providing tools that people can use in rational discourse. However, their view, by itself, is incomplete.
Moser presents a markedly different position. He identifies philosophy etymologically and historically as the love of wisdom. Hence philosophy is the application of wisdom, which Moser defines as “the love and pursuit of God’s wisdom under divine authority in Christ, which calls for an ongoing volitional union with Christ, including one’s belonging to God in Christ” (175). Moser builds his case from the book of 1 Corinthians, contrasting human wisdom from divine wisdom.[4] For his part, Oliphint points to the presuppositions that underlie both positions, even though Oppy falsely presumes philosophical neutrality. Additionally, Oliphint observes that Moser “does a wonderful service in explaining to us just what true wisdom is” (207).[5]
Oppy recognizes that Moser’s “conception of philosophy has significant historical antecedents,” but contends, “It fits very poorly with most actual philosophical practice, both ancient and modern” (201). With all due respect to Oppy, even if, for the sake of argument, his latter point is accurate—that Moser’s view of philosophy as the love of wisdom does not accord “actual philosophical practice”—it is beside the point. Is does not always equal ought; just because a given society believes the Earth is flat does not make it so.
Even so, myriad scholars would disagree with Oppy’s contention in the first place, from Ronald Nash to James Sire to Jonathan Pennington.[6] Figures like these would maintain that philosophers pursue their discipline, and people more generally live their lives, according to a given vision of life, whether or not they articulate it by the language of philosophy or wisdom per se. Thus, while Oppy and McGrew give voice to the form of philosophy, Moser rightly recognizes that it is not an empty shell but rather is filled with specific content, either according to divine wisdom or human wisdom.
Can we ultimately set aside our presuppositions?
A second point of disagreement concerns their respective views about presuppositions. Oppy describes himself as a “philosophical neutralist” (21). “Philosophy,” he contends, “is not properly characterised in terms of ontological and ideological commitments” (43). However, his interlocutors argue against him. For example, Oliphint says,
Oppy thinks the infringement of presuppositions on the philosophical enterprise renders genuine conversation impossible. But this is clearly false. . . . Our presuppositions, automatically and inevitably, always and everywhere inform our understanding of the data. . . . What is needed is not necessarily agreement but understanding (52–53).
Similarly, McGrew says, “While I appreciate the motivation behind Oppy’s desire to keep philosophy free from the dogmatic endorsement of particular worldviews, I do not see how this could possibly be done on the scale he seems to be suggesting” (54).[7]
McGrew and Oliphint offer helpful correctives. No one is ultimately neutral, because their specific understanding of concepts and words shapes their exploration and articulation of given ideas—to say nothing about how our finite backgrounds necessarily limit us. For example, Oliphint holds to the presupposition that “our minds do not function as they should,” which he premises on Biblical passages like Romans 8:4, 1 Corinthians 2:14, and Colossians 3:10 (53).[8] In response to those who would argue against this point because they reject Biblical revelation, Oliphint would point out that someone like Oppy presupposes that human rationality functions correctly.[9]
Although McGrew and Oliphint each criticize Oppy’s view, McGrew’s critique of Oliphint indicates that they may do so for different reasons. More specifically, McGrew characterizes Oliphint as “emphatically den[ying] that there is any neutral ground between Christians and non-Christians, any possibility of examining the data without assuming one’s conclusion” (174). However, McGrew has apparently misunderstood Oliphint, because the second clause does not invariably follow the first. The denial of neutral ground does not necessarily mean that people assume their conclusions. It is simply recognition that we infuse the beliefs we hold and the words we use with distinct meaning and value. After all, Oliphint affirms Oppy, with whom he otherwise disagrees, saying, “Oppy rightly notes that there is ‘the possibility of entering into genuine dialogue’ about our disagreements” (101).[10]
Conclusions
In this review, I have focused particularly on these authors’ competing ideas about the meaning of philosophy and question of presuppositions. An additional topic of profound discussion is that of natural theology, but I will reserve analysis of that for a subsequent post.
Concerning the meaning of philosophy, I appreciate Oppy’s and McGrew’s view that it is a discipline and tool of rational inquiry. However, I believe that their approach is incomplete and, consequently, find Moser’s position that the truest philosophy is founded on God and His revelation, to be helpful. Concerning the question of presuppositions, Free Will Baptists following a Forlinesean apologetic should find much in common with Oliphint, even if they would affirm a “moderate presuppositionalism” (Forlines) rather than a “Van Tilian presuppositionalism” (Oliphint).[11] Additionally, they would find that, if McGrew gives too much weight to evidences, then Moser gives too little credence to them.
Through conversations about the meaning of philosophy and the question of presuppositions, these authors demonstrate why the topic of philosophy is important for all Christians to consider. And yet it is not the most important thing. The editors fittingly conclude the volume with a quotation from Charles Malik: “The philosophers are worth nothing so far as being and existence are concerned compared to one passage from the word of God—a Psalm or chapter from Paul or the Gospels” (228).
[1]Paul M. Gould and Richard Davis, eds., Four Views on Christianity and Philosophy, Counterpoints: Bible and Theology, ed. Stanley N. Gundry (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016).
[2]In addition, McGrew describes himself as “broadly internalist” (126) and criticizes “all versions of externalism, including [Alvin] Plantinga’s version,” which “collapse into a very deep and troubling form of skepticism” (127). McGrew thus puts himself at odds with popular forms of Reformed epistemology.
[3]For example, Oppy argues that philosophy is a “discipline that addresses questions for which we do not yet know how to produce . . . agreed answers using the methods of other established disciplines” (23) and McGrew that it is “not a set of substantive beliefs; it is a discipline” (124).
[4]More specifically, Moser contrasts “human wisdom” (180–81), “wisdom of the world” (181), “eloquent wisdom” (182–84), and “speculative human arguments” (184) from “God’s wisdom” (180–85) and “spiritual wisdom” (193–94). Additionally, he focuses particularly on 1 Corinthians 1:17, 19–24, 29–31; 2:2, 4–5, 7–8.
[5]However, Oliphint does not give Moser an unqualified endorsement, writing, “Moser is partial to terms like ‘event’ and ‘self-manifestation’ and ‘experiential.’ Such terms evoke my orthodox antennae and cause me to wonder if neoorthodoxy is lurking nearby” (208).
[6]See, for example, Ronald Nash, Life’s Ultimate Questions: An Introduction to Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999); James W. Sire, Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept, 2nd edition (Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP Academic, 2015); and Jonathan T. Pennington, Jesus the Great Philosopher: Rediscovering the Wisdom Needed for the Good Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2020).
[7]McGrew does not follow Oliphint in every point. For example, he writes, “we can and must test the credentials of various purported revelations—the Judeo-Christian Scriptures, the Quran, the Book of Mormon—in order to determine where, if anywhere, there is revelation of God” (107). However, Oliphint would argue that McGrew presumes too much on human reason and makes certain assumptions about man’s epistemic capabilities. Still, Oliphint is not anti-reason: “The point here is not to refute the tools of reason given to us by God but to recognize that those tools cannot bear the weight that a foundation requires” (88). Again, he observes that a person’s first principles must be “able to sustain the substantial load that they must bear if they are to account for existence and knowledge” (119). Oliphint argues that the Christian will identify belief in the “existence and nature of God” and the “doctrine of revelation” as first principles. Non-Christians will point to other bases for their ontological and epistemological commitments, but the point is that they also have them, whether or not they admit it.
[8]Additionally, Oliphint says, “As the apostle Paul reminded the philosophers at Athens, it is not possible for me or Oppy or anyone else to see the world for what it truly is except by an act of repentance and a turn from our naturalistic worldview to belief in Christ” (53).
[9]Perhaps Oppy would deny that the belief that rationality works properly is a presupposition, or perhaps he would cite good reasons for the assertion, but then so could Oliphint assert good reasons for his belief, and round and round they could go. Ultimately, peoples’ beliefs are either justified/warranted, or they are not, in which case they adopt some kind of infinite regress, epistemic faith, or coherentism, or else they are skeptical about the prospect of knowledge in the first place.
[10]In order to flesh out McGrew’s critique of Oliphint more fully, McGrew appeals to the following quotation for his position: In a separate book, Oliphint writes, “[T]here is no neutrality. You cannot ‘prove’ the gospel simply by appealing to evidence or to some sort of logical demonstration, however sophisticated” (K. Scott Oliphint, Covenantal Apologetics: Principles and Practice in Defense of our Faith [Wheaton: Crossway, 2013], 17). However, that quotation does not support the characterization that McGrew makes. Oliphint’s point is not about the assumption of conclusions but rather about belief in the gospel. More specifically, gospel belief requires more than rational proofs precisely because of people’s presuppositions. For that reason, for example, Oliphint later refers to the “presumed neutrality or autonomy of unbelievers” (Covenantal Apologetics, 161).
In order to extend Oliphint’s point, consider: If people could simply set aside their presuppositions, then why do more unbelievers not accept Christian theism, based on the strength of the evidences that rational inquiry and discourse can provide? In many cases, it is because these unbelievers do not find these evidences to be particularly strong. However, that assertion does not mean that these evidences are weak. Two people with similar IQs and scholarly credentials can look at the same evidences and yet draw different conclusions about their relative value, a Christian finding that an argument succeeds and a non-Christian holding that it fails. This phenomenon occurs so frequently precisely because of presuppositions. Otherwise, far less people would disagree about the merits of a given argument.
[11]F. Leroy Forlines and J. Matthew Pinson, The Apologetics of Leroy Forlines (Gallatin: Welch College Press, 2019), 18–21.
Recent Comments