Existential Reasons for Belief in God (Clifford Williams)
by Jared Martin
Existential Needs (chapter 1-3)
The thesis of Clifford Williams’ book, Existential Reasons for Belief in God: A Defense of Desires and Emotions for Faith, is that the best way to acquire and maintain faith in God is through reason and need [1]. Faith may be based on either reason or need, but one without the other will ultimately be found lacking. As Williams puts it, “Need without reason is blind, but reason without need is sterile” [2]. He thinks this dichotomy is a mistake. Both need and reason are crucial to our spiritual lives.
The gist of Williams’ existential argument can be stated as follows:
1. All humans have existential needs.
2. Faith in God satisfies these existential needs.
3. Therefore, faith in God is justified.
Our existential needs (deep desires for justice, love, and meaning, for instance) in conjunction with faith in God justify our faith. This justification stems from the fact that faith satisfies our needs, which demonstrates that faith is prudential. To highlight this, Williams invokes the analogy of eating. One is justified in eating if he or she is hungry. Hunger pangs are a good reason to eat, just as existential needs are a good reason to believe in God.
Objections (chapters 4-7)
Williams’ argument raises four common objections. The first objection is that the premises of the existential argument do not guarantee the truth of God’s existence. Existential needs have no bearing on the truth or falsity of claims about God. The deep longings that we have for things such as cosmic security and justice do not offer reasons for believing that the claim God exists is true. Williams concedes this point. In response, he demonstrates that the existential argument can be combined with either fideism (faith without reason) or evidentialism (faith based on reason) to provide support for the existence of God. A fideist can add evidentially-unsupported belief to the existential argument, whereas the evidentialist can add evidentially-supported reasons for belief. Either way, the argument is now supplemented with the cognitive component (beliefs are paradigmatic cases of the cognitive) needed to meet the objection.
Given that the existential argument needs to be supplemented, Williams warns that it would be too hasty to conclude that the argument is inadequate. Evidential reasoning alone may be enough to convince us of truths that are disconnected with our existential needs. However, both need and evidence are crucial for convincing people of truths that are deeply tied to our needs.
The second objection to Williams’ argument is that it justifies belief in any god, not the Christian God. The concern here is that if our needs somehow characterize God, then some needs will yield a characterization quite different than the Christian God. Williams uses the example of torture. If someone feels the need to see humans gratuitously tortured, then faith in a tyrant-like God would be justified. In response, Williams argues that there are independent criteria whereby we can judge whether or not to accept a need as legitimate. The criteria for legitimate needs are that they must be (1) significant, (2) enduring, (3) strongly felt, (4) common to most people, and (5) consistent with the entire range of human needs and desires. These criteria successfully weed out those desires and needs that justify belief in just any god.
The third objection is that not everyone experiences existential needs. If so, the argument is a nonstarter for them since the first premise is not true in their case. One possible response is that even when some do not feel these needs, others still do. The argument doesn’t have to account for those who don’t feel, only those who do. Furthermore, a case can be made that everyone has the same needs but some don’t feel them. In these instances, certain cognitive techniques might be used to awaken their existential needs, revealing that their needs have gone unnoticed.
The final objection to the existential argument is that there are other means besides faith that can satisfy existential needs. If so, then these means would be justified in the same way that faith in God is justified. One would be justified, for example, in loving someone if it satisfied his or her existential needs. Williams responds by formulating several tests to determine whether or not other means than faith will satisfy existential needs, the outcome being that all means besides faith fail to satisfy our needs.
Faith and Emotion (chapters 8-9)
Williams’ view of faith is that it partly consists in belief and emotion. If so, then it seems that faith becomes susceptible to several common criticisms made against the emotions. These criticisms usually point out that emotions are “unstable,” “fickle,” and “disruptive,” causing us to feel that we lack control. Additionally, emotions are “blind.” As such, they do not seem to be an adequate foundation for faith. Faith needs something more reliable. Williams responds to this critique by claiming that emotions are not entirely non-cognitive. Instead, they are inextricably linked with our cognition, meaning that emotions are partly cognitive and partly non-cognitive. If emotions are partly cognitive, then they have the conceptual resources needed to make them stable.
Up until this point, most of Williams’ book considers the epistemic claim that we acquire and sustain our faith in God by both reason and need. In the final chapter, however, Williams makes a normative claim: “We should let ourselves be drawn to faith in God by need” [3]. The rationale for this is that a life of faith provides one with a range of desirable emotions, and a life of this kind has greater value than a life with less emotions.
Evaluation
One of the best things about Williams’ book is that it brings many overlooked existential needs into focus [4]. Of course, the reason for drawing these needs into view is to show how they connect with faith, and this helps us to better understand ourselves. This tack is nothing new in the Christian tradition, as many have argued that humans have a God-shaped hole in their heart, e.g., Augustine, Pascal, Lewis, and Kierkegaard. But Williams reveals just how gaping the hole really is!
Another virtue of William’s book is that it conforms to Scriptural teachings about our need for God. Christ came to save those who are needy! Throughout the Bible, man is depicted as a creature entirely dependent on God. According to Christ, these are the people that He came to save (Lk. 4:18). In fact, those who don’t have needs are the ones who will have difficulty entering heaven (Mk. 10:23-25).
A final strength is that Williams demonstrates how flexible the existential argument can be. It can be joined with other approaches to apologetics in order to develop a robust defense of the Christian faith. Of course, William’s main objective is to show how need and reason are what faith rest on. To this end, he spends most of the book showing how the existential argument works in conjunction with evidential support. But one can see how the existential argument can be supplemented with a special-knowledge model of faith, where faith is characterized as an appropriate response to God’s Word aided by the Holy Spirit.
A quick sketch of something along these lines might look like this. Faith depends both upon our needs and upon God’s Word. On one hand, our faith depends on needs in the sense that our existential needs give rise to our faith. We are motivated by our existential needs to search for their satisfaction, which can be characterized as a longing to believe God’s Word. On the other hand, faith depends on God’s Word in the sense that we seek security in God’s Word. Scripture grounds our faith, and we grow strong in our faith by believing and resting on God’s promises. So, according to this sketch, faith can depend both upon needs and upon God’s word [5].
Conclusion
In closing, I recommend Williams’ book for anyone who is interested in the role that existential needs play in relation to faith. Obviously, anyone who is interested in apologetics should read it as well, since it is a nice complement to some of the work in the area. Williams is a philosopher, and this shows in his writing and argumentation. Even so, the book is readily accessible to laymen since Williams adeptly communicates complex ideas. There are plenty of issues to wrangle over in Williams book (e.g., the nature of emotions and the nature of faith), but, on the whole, most people will find it thought-provoking, well-crafted, and useful for a defense of Christian faith.
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[1] Clifford Williams, Existential Reasons for Belief in God: A Defense of Desires and Emotions for Faith (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2011), 176.
[2] Ibid., 12.
[3] Ibid., 176.
[4] He accomplishes this by describing thirteen existential needs, separating them into two categories: self-directed needs and other-directed needs. No doubt, his characterization will resonate with most readers.
[5] The dependency relation between faith and needs and the dependency relation between faith and God’s word are different. In the first dependency relation, faith is generated by our existential needs. In the latter dependency relation, faith relies on God’s word for security. To use Williams’ analogy, hunger is a different reason for eating than food. Hunger generates the desire to eat, but food is relied on for nourishment. Eating, then, has a different dependency relation with respect to hunger than it does with respect to food. Similarly, the dependence of faith on needs is different than the dependence of faith on God’s word. Faith is generated by need, and faith relies on God’s word.
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About the Author: Holding degrees in art, music, theology, and philosophy, Jared Martin has wide-ranging interests. Currently, he is pursing a PhD in philosophy at Temple University. When he isn’t studying, he spends time with his wife, Mary Ann, enjoying city life in Philadelphia.
May 14, 2013
Thinking of reading this book this summer – thanks for this review. Also, what is the focus of your PhD?
May 15, 2013
Hello Jeremy. I mostly work in Metaphysics.