Christian Doctrines is one of my favorite courses to teach at Welch College. This course introduces students to the core doctrines of the Christian faith from a Reformed Arminian and Free Will Baptist perspective. One of my favorite lectures to give concerns the doctrines of foreknowledge, election, and predestination. Some (not all) of my Arminian and Calvinist students alike are surprised when I tell them I believe in these doctrines because they associate them with Calvinist teaching. The problem with denying them is that the New Testament plainly uses the language of proginōskō (to foreknow), eklegomai (to elect), and proorizō (to predestine).[1]
If I would be a Bible-believing Christian, I would confess the truth of these doctrines. Fundamentally, the question is not whether we believe in them but how we interpret them. Over the course of the next three articles, I will consider the doctrines of foreknowledge, election, and predestination by analyzing the passages in which they appear. Like F. Leroy Forlines, Robert E. Picirilli, and others, I do not take them to be synonymous.[2] This article examines foreknowledge, whereas the subsequent two will consider election and predestination, respectively. At times, these topics will overlap as an extension of passage in question. Additionally (and partly owing to space), I do not engage substantively the otherwise helpful secondary literature, though I appeal some to Forlines and Picirilli; even so, the literature is in the background of much of my thinking.
Overview
The language of divine foreknowing (proginōskō) or divine foreknowledge (prognōsis) occurs in only five verses throughout the New Testament: Acts 2:23; Romans 8:29; 11:2; and 1 Peter 1:2, 20. A summary of these passages indicates that God has foreknown the sacrifice of Jesus Christ and the election of His children. Concerning Jesus’ crucifixion, Peter preached that God foreknew Jesus would be killed by godless men (Acts 2:22–23). Again, Peter wrote that God foreknew Jesus as the unblemished and spotless lamb of God before the foundation of the world (1 Peter 1:19–20). Concerning the believer’s election, Peter also confessed that God has foreknown the elect (1:1–2). Likewise, Paul believed that God has foreknown those who would love Him (Romans 8:28–29) and that He has foreknown His people Israel (11:2).
As we will see, these verses teach that God has foreknown these events, but they do not teach that His foreknowledge has caused those events. Knowing and causing are distinct phenomena. In fact, the term proginōskō means “to know beforehand” and does not necessitate causation.[3] Still, Picirilli observes, it sometimes (but not always) refers to more than “mere prescience,” partly because of how it is related to the doctrines of election and predestination (which will be the subject of subsequent articles).[4]
By way of analogy, we might say that God has certain knowledge of future events similar to how we have certain knowledge of past events, with a key difference being that God’s knowledge is perfect whereas ours is not. However, that we know the past does not by necessity mean we have caused it; that God knows the future does not by necessity mean He causes it. “God foreknows everything future as certain. That certainty of future events does not lie in their necessity but in their simple factness,” Picirilli explains. “But that knowledge per se, even though it is foreknowledge, has no more causal effect on the facts than our knowledge of certain past facts has on them.”[5] Hence, divine foreknowledge is just that: knowledge beforehand.
In addition, the New Testament’s usage of proginōskō is not limited to God but applies also to human beings. Specifically, Acts 26:5 and 2 Peter 3:17 use it in the sense that a person might foreknow someone’s character or instruction; that is, they have known it prior to the moment in question. Picirilli suggests that this sense of the word is akin to the idea of “wise foresight.”[6] To be clear, divine foreknowledge and human “foreknowledge” are distinct; at the same time, these instances demonstrate the breadth of this term in the Greek language. For these reasons, the idea of foreknowledge by no means necessarily negates the idea of genuine human choice.
Having given an overview of this doctrine, we will now consider the relevant passages on which this overview is built individually.
Acts
In Acts 2:23, Peter preached: “[T]his Man, delivered over by the predetermined plan and foreknowledge [prognōsei] of God, you [men of Israel] nailed to a cross by the hands of godless men and put Him to death” (NASB95). Here, Peter asserted both divine foreknowledge and human agency. God foreknew that Jesus would be crucified, but strictly lawless men crucified Him. The text does not say these men crucified Jesus because of God’s foreknowledge, only that He foreknew and that they acted. For this reason, Forlines argued that this instance of foreknowledge could be interpreted as “instrumental” rather than “causal” so that the integrity of the “freedom of choice” is maintained.[7] Hence, Peter upheld both divine foreknowledge and human choice without either contradicting the other. I will consider the language of “predetermined plan” from this passage in my discussion of predestination (in a later article), but in summary, it is not the language of predestination (proorizō) but rather that of determination (hōrismenē) and is used of man and God alike (e.g., Acts 11:29; 17:26), meaning it does not negate human agency.
Acts 26:5 also uses the language of proginōskō but applies it to humans. In this verse Paul attested before Agrippa that the Jews had known Paul’s manner of life for a long time (literally, “knowing [proginōskontes] me from the first”) and could testify that he had lived as a strict Pharisee (vv. 4–5). In a manner of speaking, these Jews foreknew (that is, knew beforehand) Paul’s character because they had known him since his childhood; hence, says Picirilli, this usage relates to “knowledge of the past” but could also be translated “knew [about] in advance.”[8] Analogously, we might “foreknow” the character of a friend because we have known him for a long time so that we know in advance what sort of fellow he will (likely) be in a given situation.
Romans
Just as Paul used the language of foreknowledge in his defense before Agrippa, he also used it in his letter to the Romans: “And we know that God causes all things to work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose. For those whom He foreknew [proegnō], He also predestined . . .” (8:28–29). I will analyze the relevancy of this passage for the doctrine of predestination in a later piece. For now, though, Paul plainly explained that believers have loved God and that God has foreknown them. But he did not state believers have loved God because He foreknew them. As Picirilli observes, “[T]his passage neither affirms or denies that the eternal selection is conditional or unconditional.”[9] Paul stated only that God has foreknown those who love him, thereby preserving both the possibility of both human choice and divine foreknowledge.
Paul also used the same word proegnō in 11:2, writing that God has not rejected His people (Israel) whom He foreknew. Again, he did not claim that God has not rejected them because He foreknew them, only that He has not rejected them and that He has foreknown them. On the one hand, we recognize with Forlines, who referred to this usage as an “affectionate foreknowing,” that this verse emphasizes “corporate Israel.”[10] On the other hand, we also recognize that corporate Israel is comprised of individuals and, interpreting 11:2 in consideration of 8:28–29, could argue that God has not rejected those whom He has foreknown will love Him.
After all, Paul acknowledged that “it is not as though the word of God has failed. For they are not all Israel who are descended from Israel” (9:6). That is, some will love God (8:28), and some will be hardened against Him (9:18; 11:7, 25). I recognize that Romans 9–11 forms a complicated argument and that I have left much about it unexamined. But in relation to Paul’s understanding of foreknowledge, I propose that 11:2 does not require divine causation or violate human agency (in fact, Picirilli suggests that proegnō in this passage may be more in line with the meaning of foreknowledge in Acts 26:5, namely, that it relates to knowledge of the past).[11]
1–2 Peter
Finally, consistent with his language in Acts, Peter also appealed to the language of foreknowledge in his letters. In 1 Peter 1:1–2, he wrote that election is based on the Father’s foreknowledge (eklektois . . . kata prognōsin theou patros). This passage is important for a proper understanding of election (the subject of a later piece). In summary, though, it teaches that God’s election is based on foreknowledge—as Picirilli says, “[E]lection, here, is subordinate to foreknowledge”—which, as we have seen, is generally the knowledge of future choices.[12] It does not teach, however, that election is based on arbitrary decree. This reading of Peter is consistent with the language of his sermon in Acts 2:23 where he affirmed both divine foreknowledge and human choice.
Again, Peter used the language of foreknowledge in verse 20, stating that Christ was foreknown (literally, “having been foreknown [proegnōsmenou]”) before the foundation of the world for believers’ sakes so that they might be saved through Him. This passage repeats the theme of Acts 2:23: God foreknew that Jesus would be crucified (and knowing that, He sent His Son into the world), but God did not directly cause His crucifixion because it was wicked men who nailed Him to the cross. Additionally, the immediate context of this verse plainly asserts human agency because in verse 17 Peter stated that the Father will judge each one according to his work (1:17). Thus, Peter repeatedly spoke in terms of human choice and divine foreknowledge and did not think of them as being inconsistent.
A final example appears in 2 Peter 3:17, which bears the most similarity to Acts 26:5 because it concerns the proginōskō of human beings. Specifically, it reads that these believers had previously known (literally, “knowing beforehand [proginōskontes]”) Paul’s writings, which teach them diligence and patience (vv. 14–15). These believers could act with diligence and patience because—again, in a manner of speaking—they foreknew the writings of Paul (that is, they knew them beforehand), but their knowing them previously did not cause them to act in that manner, which otherwise required agency on their part. Analogously, we might “foreknow” how a book will end because we read it prior to the moment in question, but our prior knowledge does not cause its ending. Again, to be clear, the phenomena of divine and human foreknowledge are distinct, but both usages illustrate that foreknowledge and choice are not mutually exclusive.
Conclusion
In summary, the New Testament testifies explicitly to the truth of God’s foreknowledge of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ and of the election of believers. Of course, we have no reason not to believe that God foreknows everything—He is, after all, omniscient. But also, these passages do not textually establish a causal link between foreknowledge and choice. They simply present them both as being true.
The doctrine of divine foreknowledge is a rich doctrine of the Christian faith. It teaches us about the attribute of God’s omniscience (1 John 3:20), which is the foundation for His foreknowledge. Our God is magnificent because He knows all: past, present, and future. It also teaches us about the attribute of His love because He, knowing that humankind would sin, arranged for his salvation through the cross of Christ and has elected us—chosen us—to be His children. “[W]hile we were yet sinners, Christ died for us” (Romans 5:8). Finally, the doctrine of divine foreknowledge teaches us not to be anxious about our tomorrows (Matthew 6:25–34; Philippians 4:6–7) but to trust in the providence of the God who already knows what our tomorrows will bring. He has provided for us in the past; He will also provide for us in the present and future.
[1] Many thanks to my peer reviewers, Phillip T. Morgan, Rebekah Zúñiga, and Christopher Talbot, as well as to Matthew McAffee who helped me with the transliterations; all credit is due to them, and any mistakes are my own.
[2] E.g., F. Leroy Forlines, The Quest for Truth: Answering Life’s Inescapable Questions (Nashville: Randall House, 2002), 395.
[3] BDAG 866.
[4] Robert E. Picirilli, Grace Faith, Free Will: Contrasting Views of Salvation; Calvinism and Arminianism (Nashville: Randall House, 2002), 79.
[5] Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will, 38.
[6] Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will, 79.
[7] Forlines, The Quest for Truth, 341–42, 396.
[8] Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will, 77, 79 (brackets in original).
[9] Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will, 78.
[10] Forlines, The Quest for Truth, 399 (italics removed).
[11] Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will, 77, 79 (brackets in original).
[12] Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will, 79.
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