The Meaning of Free Will
Few ideas are freighted with more baggage than free will. Though the debate between determinists and libertarians is often an intellectual struggle among philosophers, the question of whether human choices are free or determined influences countless everyday issues [1]. Robert Kane surmises this well as he names the following issues that hinge upon the “free will versus determinism” debate:
(1) Moral agency and responsibility, dignity, desert, accountability, and blameworthiness in ethics;
(2) The nature and limits of human freedom, autonomy, coercion, and control in social and political theory;
(3) Issues about compulsion, addiction, self-control, self-deception, and weakness of will in philosophical psychology;
(4) Criminal liability, responsibility, and punishment in legal theory;
(5) The relations of mind to body, consciousness, and the nature of action, and personhood in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive and neurosciences;
(6) The nature of rationalist and rational choice in philosophy and social theory;
(7) Questions about divine foreknowledge, predestination, evil, and human freedom in theology and philosophy of religion; and
(8) General metaphysical issues about necessity and possibility, determinism, time and chance, quantum reality, laws of nature, causation, and explanation in philosophy and the sciences [2].
Whether we watch recent films like Inception (2010) or The Adjustment Bureau (2011), experience anxiety over our family medical history, or simply read Scripture, thinking about freedom and fate is really unavoidable.
It is this latter area (Kane’s #7) that concerns most Christians. Therefore, this essay will provide a definition and brief explanation of free will, as well as the context in which this topic pertains to ongoing theological discussions.
Clarifying Our Terms
Traditionally, people were thought to possess free will when (1) they could choose among alternative possibilities; and (2) the origin of their choices was within them, and not coerced. For instance, I may be able to choose between vanilla ice cream or chocolate, but if someone is threatening me at gunpoint to select vanilla, then it is doubtful that my decision is truly free. I could still choose chocolate, but at my own peril.
These two premises have more than one layer to ponder. What, for example, constitutes coercion? And just because a decision seems to arise from within me, isn’t it possible that this decision has been shaped by factors beyond my conscious awareness? We quickly see that the free will debate is complicated. As Kane puts it, “Free will becomes an issue when . . . humans realize how profoundly the world may influence them in ways previously unknown” [3].
Determinism arises as a rival to free will when considering how choices may not be as free as they seem. In its simplest form, determinism is the belief that every event or choice has a cause [4]. In particular, it is a cause that overrides the person’s ability to make what would otherwise be a free choice. Something can be determined on theological grounds (“God made it so”), biological grounds (“It was genetically unavoidable that I inherited this disease”), logical grounds (“All events, including human choices, have a prior cause”), or on some other basis. This raises more questions that require some explanation.
Even the most strident proponent of human freedom understands that past events, choices, and other factors influence future decisions. I can reasonably claim that I will never play professional baseball. Is it logically impossible? No; All I must do is show up for spring training, get in the good graces of a coach or general manager, and earn myself a contract. Yet previous decisions I’ve made concerning my athletic training (along with the physical make-up of a Watts!) have so shaped my life that it is basically impossible for me to do this now. Does this mean that free choice is an illusion since this career option is unavailable to me? For practical purposes, no.
We can see where the tentacles of this topic reach far—farther than space will permit. However, another component of this debate that helps address these questions is whether choices can be free and determined at the same time. To be more specific, can we be morally accountable for our decisions, even ones that are determined? Compatibilists believe so.
Compatibilists believe it is possible that choices can be free and determined simultaneously. Though compatibilists construe their arguments differently, they don’t believe determinism discounts freedom. Typically they are concerned with preserving the idea of moral accountability and authentic human choice, as well as acknowledging the obvious forces that determine human life.
This debate continues even to the present time, with neither side gaining the upper hand for too long.
Putting It All Together: God, Morality, and Salvation
The concerns that most Christians have regarding these issues are three-fold:
(1) Can we be free if God already knows the future;
(2) Can we be morally accountable if determinism is true; and
(3) What implications do free will or determinism have for salvation?
Each question merits its own essay. However, we’ll briefly consider how two common proposals (one for free will, and one for compatibilism) offer some preliminary options for answering such questions.
Controversy was sparked several years ago when some members of the Evangelical Theological Society espoused “open theism.” Essentially, this view holds this: If the future is truly open based on authentic human choices, then it is beyond God’s knowledge to some degree. Open theists thought this view was biblically justifiable as well as philosophically helpful. If God knows the future, and His knowledge of future events is certain, then how can future decisions be chosen freely? Open theism seemed to help deal with the problem.
This problem has been addressed more than once (perhaps most famously by Boethius in the 6th century). However, Robert Picirilli has given a clear, contemporary response:
While we cannot know the future, we can know past events, and know them as certain. At the same time, the certainty lies in their factness, and our knowledge of them affects that factness in no way at all. The knowledge issues from our awareness of the facts. Just so, God foreknows everything future as certain. That certainty of future events does not lie in their necessity but in their simple factness. They will be the way they will be . . . and God knows what they will be because he has perfect awareness, in advance, of all facts. But that knowledge per se, even though it is foreknowledge, has no more causal effect on the facts than our knowledge of certain past facts has on them [5].
For free will advocates challenged by contention #1 above, Picirilli helps us to see an important distinction: the one between certainty and necessity. By extension, many espouse such a perspective on freedom and foreknowledge because they believe it preserves free will, God’s sovereignty, as well as moral accountability. After all, if my decisions (including my sinful ones) are predetermined, how can I be held morally responsible? But as to how freedom and salvation relate, different theological traditions offer their own explanations.
D. A. Carson is perhaps the most accessible expositor of theological compatibilism. Carson argues that the following propositions are affirmed in Scripture: (1) God is absolutely sovereign [determinism], but not in a way that eliminates human responsibility; and (2) human beings are morally responsible creatures who make significant decisions, though never in a way that makes God contingent upon them [6]. Carson contends are the assumption of countless biblical texts.
Though compatibilism will sound appealing for believers trying to account for the potency of both views, one notices upon closer inspection that compatibilists define free will differently. Free will ends up meaning “the ability to do what one desires to do.” Thus, one is seemingly choosing according to their will. Libertarians would say this approach assumes an illegitimate view of free will to preserve the moral accountability of human choices.
Concluding Reflections
Like most debates, the definition of terms is critical. Part of why human freedom is upheld, even by those who affirm determinism, is that they have limited the conventional definition of free will to mean choosing that which one desires [7]. However one defines it, it must be articulated so an accurate assessment of any view can be made.
Second, advocates of free will, determinism, or compatibilism each have their own pressure points. Perhaps this is the nature of finite humans unraveling a mystery. Though philosophers and scientists have their own disagreements, theologians dealing with this challenging issue should be honest about the tensions and limitations of their explanatory models.
Finally, we should remember that this area of theology is not a settled discussion. Those who believe (such as myself) that determinism fails to provide an account of key issues, such as the problem of evil, should continue trying to articulate a biblical account of freedom and God’s sovereignty to each generation. It’s insufficient to focus solely on the weaknesses of alternative accounts. Intellectual virtue demands we make sure that the view we offer satisfies where other accounts fail.
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[1] By “libertarian,” I am simply using the generic term for those who espouse the traditional understanding of free will. Determinism (if the name itself doesn’t say enough for itself) is defined later in this essay.
[2] Robert Kane, “Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Kane (NY: OEP, 2002), 4.
[3] Kane, 5.
[4] Theodore Sider, “Free Will and Determinism,” in Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics, Sider and Conee (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 113.
[5] R. E. Picirilli, “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Future,” JETS 43/2 (June 2000) 259–271.
[6] D. A. Carson, How Long, O Lord? Reflections on Suffering and Evil (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 179-191. Robert Peterson echoes a similar perspective in Election and Free Will: God’s Gracious Choice and Our Responsibility (P&R, 2007).
[7] Typically such individuals affirm the traditional definition of free will, but only prior to the Fall. After the Fall, freedom is lost and becomes simply the choice of depraved creatures—thus, the need for God’s intervention to save since people would never freely choose God on their own (Calvinists and Reformed Arminians agree on this point
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